Karim Mezran, director of the Atlantic Council's North Africa Initiative and among the world's leading experts on Libya, analyses the country's crisis with Formiche.net, denouncing the failure of political transition and growing external interference. According to Mezran, the Boulos Plan risks imposing an agreement lacking internal consensus, fuelling new tensions and further compromising prospects for democratic stabilisation.
27/07/2026
The population suffers greatly from the lack of legitimate and active governance serving the collective good. Growing discontent therefore flows almost entirely toward the ruling elites both in the East — where Khalifa Haftar rules with an iron fist and constant repression from his militia family — and in the West, where amid vast fragmentation of civil and military authority, the GNU (Government of National Unity) presided over by Abdelhamid Dabaiba, a businessman from Misrata who has disregarded his UN mandate since 2021 to hold free elections nationwide. Karim Mezran, dean of Libya experts globally and director of the Atlantic Council's North Africa Initiative, describes the condition of the North African country with which Italy has the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic leverage.
"Everyone knows the current situation is unsustainable and they say so. But whether anyone actually wants to do something about it is quite another matter," he concludes. Why? "The perception among most of the population, both East and West, of a situation marked by great political and macroeconomic confusion and helplessness stems from various factors — some internal, others driven more by external factors." Among these, he recalls, is the presence of Russian forces supporting Haftar, but also Turkey's gradual and cautious policy of rapprochement with Haftar driven chiefly by the economic needs of Ankara and Istanbul elites, "which is disrupting public perception, as people no longer understand those (the Turks, ed.) who saved Tripoli and the West of the country by intervening alongside Libyan forces that fiercely resisted Haftar's armed aggression in 2019." And Egypt? Is it still an influential actor? "Despite having considerable political, military and economic interests in eastern Libya, and despite being the fundamental creators and supporters of the Benghazi general, the Egyptians are in a phase of deafening silence. Yet this Egyptian no-comment fits perfectly with the other side of the picture — the domestic one."
Mezran recalls that post-revolution negotiations among various Libyan actors have been conducted by the United Nations through a special envoy of the UN Secretary-General. "Today we are at the eleventh envoy to succeed in the chair of head of the UN mission Unsmil. Years of costly mediation have passed without any development in the direction of democracy and reconstruction of the Libyan state even being attempted. This has contributed greatly to the dramatic loss of prestige and respect for the international organisation."
The United Nations, however, is not giving up: the new envoy, Hanna Tetteh, has presented a reform plan that envisages an interim prime minister and a narrow cabinet, designed solely to take the country to free elections by 2027. "Ignoring this plan in turn," Mezran notes, "Libyan actors such as the president of the Tobruk parliament, Agila Saleh, always loyal to Haftar, and the president of the State Council Mohamed Takala, close to Tripoli, have developed their own version of UN reforms, but proceeding without real popular backing."
Into all these dynamics comes an American plan that appears to be gaining consensus, or at least international attention. "Washington has awakened from a long sleep, driven also by the personal interests of President Donald Trump, including the prestige of the Nobel Peace Prize. The presidential envoy and in-law, Mossad Boulos (father of Michael Boulos, married to Tiffany Trump, daughter of President Donald, ed.), attributes himself a full mandate to negotiate an agreement between the two Libyan factions. With the support of minor actors, including Italy, he develops a plan based on direct understanding between the two families, with the risk of 'Middle Easternisation' of American policy instead of the hoped-for democratisation of the Middle East and North Africa."
Boulos has laid out only a few points of the plan, though they were enough to stir Libyan feelings and repositioning. The Plan provides for the appointment of Saddam Haftar, the general's son and a controversial figure for alleged abuses of power, as president of the Presidential Council, the highest state office under the institutional structure conceived years ago by the UN, with current premier Dabaiba remaining in his position (with some additional powers). "Not much else is known about this American plan, but even this was enough to unleash discontent among the population and outright rejection by numerous members of the current Libyan elite."
The Americans are trying to present certain moves, such as for example the reunification of the state budget, as a first success of the Boulos Plan, but Libyans are sceptical. The Atlantic Council expert explains that they fear the transactional nature of the decision, "since it effectively does nothing but legitimise the kleptocracy in power, legitimising it to plunder state coffers with impunity."
It is clear that there is significant American attention to the Boulos Plan, as indicated also by some institutional meetings held in Washington. At the end of June, Saddam Haftar was received by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while a representative of the Dabaiba government, Abdulsalam Zoubi, met with Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau. These contacts have been interpreted by various observers as a sign of diplomatic acceleration around the plan, contributing to an increasingly heated debate among different Libyan political components.
Yet the Boulos Plan is rejected mainly on a fundamental principle: it is perceived as a colonial-type imposition because it brings to power families not representative of the population. "The Dabaiba," Mezran continues, "are a small clan in Tripolitania. And everyone knows how they made their money, and the Haftar are not the expression of eastern populations but rather were imposed by the Egyptians and the Emiratis so as to create in Libya an armed opposition to the feared seizure of power, also in Libya, by affiliates of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organisation."
Mazran observes that the Boulos Plan stems more from a strong external push than from a fully consolidated internal sharing process, and that consensus in the country remains fragile. For the expert, the concern is that strong insistence by the United States and its partners could lead to formal adoption of this Haftar-Dabaiba arrangement, with the risk that such an agreement would remain exposed to "structural fragility and possible future tensions, with the risk of new phases of instability and further weakening of the country's already delicate unitary framework."
The Atlantic Council expert recalls that the Italian government, at least in the initial declarations of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and within the framework of the Mattei Plan, had expressed the objective of favouring a more stable Libya oriented towards institutional reconstruction.
