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Between China and the USA, Europe seeks a third way on minerals: it goes through Africa

While Brussels pushes for an industrial revival through the Industrial Accelerator Act, an uncomfortable question remains unanswered: can Europe rebuild strategic industries without rethinking how it industrializes with its partners? The tension is particularly evident in the race for critical minerals—the fundamental inputs of green, digital and […] industrial strategies

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Between China and the USA, Europe seeks a third way on minerals: it goes through Africa

Western anxiety over minerals usually framed as raw materials access problem

Western anxiety over minerals is usually framed as a raw materials access problem: too much dependence on unstable geographies, too much geopolitical risk, too much China. The analysis of Maddalena Procopio, senior policy fellow in the Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

30/05/2026

As Brussels pushes for industrial revival through the Industrial Accelerator Act, an uncomfortable question remains unanswered: can Europe rebuild strategic industries without rethinking how it industrialises with its own partners? The tension is particularly evident in the race for critical minerals — the fundamental inputs of green industrial, digital, and defence strategies. And Africa is the most important, and most neglected, test case.

Western anxiety over minerals is usually framed as a raw materials access problem: too much dependence on unstable geographies, too much geopolitical risk, too much China. Hence the recent stockpiling initiatives by the United States and Europe. However, the diagnosis is misleading. The real bottleneck is not extraction. It is processing. China dominates today not because it possesses most of the world's minerals, but because it refines and transforms them into high-value materials. For many of these, it controls between 60 and 80 per cent of global refining capacity. What matters geopolitically is not who extracts them from the ground, but who controls the nodes that transform these rocks into batteries, magnets, and defence systems.

This distinction is crucial for Africa. The continent has minerals in abundance, but lacks processing capacity at scale. Consequently, the productive capacity of its buyers shapes relationships in profoundly different ways. Washington responds to the crisis by betting on onshoring: rebuilding domestic refining capacity, treating minerals as strategic reserves. The logic is defensible, but it puts American and African interests in direct competition. Both want to move up the value chain and be the place where raw material becomes industrial input. It is unlikely that this competition will be resolved in Africa's favour when political pressure in Washington is to create American jobs in US plants. Whatever the diplomatic language, the US-Africa relationship on minerals risks remaining extractive with faster mining dressed up as partnership.

Europe is a different case. Despite similar dependence on processing, it lacks the political will to address it internally. Processing is expensive, energy-intensive and unpopular: it generates emissions, industrial impact, and the kind of environmental controversies that European public opinion and regulators poorly tolerate. A February 2026 European Court of Auditors report warned that the bloc is set to miss its 2030 targets for domestic extraction and processing. Europe cannot solve this knot alone. This creates for Africa a concrete negotiating opening. If Europe cannot continue to depend on China and does not want to process minerals at home, it needs a third option. Africa, with its substantial reserves and a continental political demand for industrialisation beyond extraction, is one of the few candidates capable of offering it at scale. The African Union's push for the beneficiation process — ensuring that minerals are at least partially processed before export — structurally aligns with what Europe needs, but cannot guarantee.

Alignment on paper — evidenced by the numerous strategic partnerships signed between the EU and African countries since 2022 — has repeatedly failed to produce concrete results. The reason is structural. Europe can help address the challenges that undermine Africa's supply capacity — infrastructure, energy, logistics, and skills development — but these investments remain inert without simultaneous demand guarantees: above all, long-term purchase agreements at prices that make investments in continental processing economically sustainable.

The result is a persistent coordination failure that condemns Africa to exporting raw materials, and leaves Europe with a strategically ineffective diversification approach. Overcoming this deadlock requires both sides to move simultaneously. African governments must invest in infrastructure and create a favourable business context, avoiding nationalist measures that discourage investment before industrial fundamentals are in order. Europe, meanwhile, must ensure that investments to improve supply in Africa are part of a single package with demand-guarantee measures, accepting political and financial risks, and considering African industrialisation a strategic partnership, not a peripheral development project. The choice is clear: reproduce an extractive model, or a new industrial order. Neither Africa nor Europe can achieve their own objectives alone, and an inward-looking "Made in Europe" approach will only hinder efforts for European security.

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Source: formiche.net

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Original headline
Tra Cina e Usa, l’Europa cerca una terza via nei minerali: passa dall’Africa
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